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ESSAY
COMMUTING TO MARS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS
ABRAHAM AND RABIN
Ryan Calo*
As Yogi Berra once said, it is difficult to make predictions, especially
about the future. In Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility
for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, Professors Kenneth
Abraham and Robert Rabin propose a detailed system for addressing
injuries caused by driverless cars.1 The system strikes me as sensible and
well thought out given how we use cars today. But if our relationship to
vehicles continues to shift with the technology, then the solution on offer
has the potential to unravel.
The remarks that follow are less about the particular wisdom of
manufacturer enterprise responsibility (MER) for driverless cars, and
more about the limits of legal scholarship in grappling with unfolding
technologic change. The contingency of technology and its social impacts
caution against sweeping interventions. And the role of law and
technology scholarship—as opposed to legal scholarship that touches
upon technology—is arguably to recognize the unique challenges that
arise at this intersection.
* I am the Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Associate Professor of Law and the Faculty
Co-Director of the Tech Policy Lab at the University of Washington. I would like to thank the
editors of the Virginia Law Review for their excellent edits and suggestions as well as
Professors Abraham and Rabin for their enlightening article.
1
Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 Va. L. Rev. 127 (2019).
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I.
Driverless cars are having a moment. It is not their first. In the 1990s,
the Department of Transportation (DOT) became very invested in the
prospect of automated vehicles for many of the same reasons that
Professors Abraham and Rabin cite. The agency wrote lengthy reports on
the technology and even funded an ambitious demonstration, which took
place in California in 1997 to great acclaim.2 The event garnered
unprecedented media attention and popularized a term, “Intelligent
Transportation Systems,” that Professors Abraham and Rabin never use,
and that you have probably never even heard.3
Thirty years ago, the DOT assumed that the intelligence behind
automated vehicles would arise from the infrastructure—street smarts, as
it were. The cars of the future (i.e., of today) were to ride upon virtual
rails embedded in highways and roads. Automated vehicles would avoid
collision by monitoring one another, but primarily they would interact
with an augmented transportation environment.
This configuration did not come to pass. If it had, the legal structures
Professors Abraham and Rabin propose—responsive as they are to the
complex, sometimes inscrutable design decisions made by individual
manufacturers—would be of limited utility. What occurred instead is that
innovations in sensing technology and machine learning in the wake of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand
Challenge in Nevada shepherded in an era of driverless cars with good
enough sensors and processors to navigate our streets without
coordination or assistance.4
Professors Abraham and Rabin aim their sensible intervention at the
contemporary model of a driverless car and the “radically new world of
auto accidents” it portends.5 On their view, which is widely shared by
government and industry, we should expect more and more vehicles on
the road that are capable of driving without human intervention. At some
2 For a first-hand description, see Chuck Thorpe et al., The 1997 Automated Highway Free
Agent Demonstration, 1998 IEEE 496–501.
3 Berkeley California PATH, National Automated Highway Systems Consortium (2019),
[https://perma.cc/PV68-GR49] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019) (“Demo ’97 generated an unprecedented level of media attention for Intelligent Transportation Systems, and we have made no
attempt to capture the media aspects of that event here.”).
4 See John Markoff, Machines of Loving Grace: The Quest for Common Ground Between
Humans and Robots 23, 28–29, 36 (2015) (discussing advances in machines in the wake of
the DARPA Grand Challenge).
5 Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 128–29.
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point these vehicles will reach a critical mass—say, twenty-five percent
of all registered vehicles6—at which time the recommendation is to pass
sweeping national legislation that preempts state regulations and common
law and establishes primary and exclusive liability for bodily injury in
manufactures through a mandatory fund.7
The authors assume that driverless cars will continue to operate
roughly as they do in prototype. I see this as a solid assumption about the
technology. From what I know of the state of driverless car technology,
and particularly given the enormous investments by industry in sensors
and machine learning, I would be surprised if the basic approach to
automating vehicles were to shift again dramatically in the near term.
I would be equally surprised if Americans retained anything like their
present relationship to cars.
It is tempting to understand driver automation as simply the end point
of a continuum, a mental model that the five “levels” developed by the
Society of Automotive Engineers reinforces.8 In actuality, the prospect of
vehicles that do not require humans to drive them represents a
qualitatively distinct affordance. Think of how different cities would look
if parking downtown were unnecessary.9 Imagine the variations in vehicle
design that the absence of steering wheels, pedals, or even windshields
will support. Consider how a vehicle that could safely drop your child off
at school would affect your commute or the shape of your school district.
Indeed, traditional automotive engineers are not driving the present
revolution. The leaders in the field of automated vehicles are technology
companies. Driverless car pioneer Waymo is a spinoff of Google, which
of course provides free digital services on an advertising model. Its
nearest rival is Uber, a ride-sharing app that delivers transportation on
demand. These companies are not interested in selling cars to
individuals—they invest billions in automation because of the prospect of
a limitless, exquisitely coordinated reservoir of robots capable of moving
people around.

6

Id. at 132.
See id. at 148–49, 151–52.
8 The authors describe and embrace the levels in the Introduction. Id. at 129–31.
9 See Alan Ohnsman, The End Of Parking Lots As We Know Them: Designing For A
Driverless Future, Forbes (May 18, 2018, 11:31 AM), [https://perma.cc/FSJ5-A34J]; Tech
Policy Lab, Driverless Seattle: How Cities Can Prepare for Automated Vehicles (Mar. 1,
2017), [https://perma.cc/M7GN-ZMUC].
7
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The prospect that widespread vehicle autonomy will dramatically alter
the way humans get around has consequences, including for the proposal
Professors Abraham and Rabin lay out in careful detail. As Professors
Abraham and Rabin remark in passing, “private vehicle ownership may
go the way of the horse-and-buggy.”10 Nevertheless, the liability system
on offer repeatedly assumes that individuals will own and insure their own
cars. For example, MER would exclude property damage on the apparent
assumption that highly automated vehicle owners “still will likely
purchase conventional auto insurance.”11
When I conceive of even the immediate future of driverless vehicles, I
do not think of a trip to the Volkswagen dealership to trade in my level
three for a shiny new level four. I think of diversified fleets of automated
vehicles owned by the companies that made them, or by large civic units
such as cities, and deployed as a transportation resource in the near term.
The relationship between an injured consumer and a private or public
service, meanwhile, raises distinct considerations from traditional
products liability. And while Uber and Volkswagen are each capable of
spreading and avoiding costs, the incentive structure of an app-based
technology company that both owns and operates its vehicles differs
rather markedly from that of a car manufacturer that sells vehicles to
people.
I don’t have a crystal ball, any more than the authors. Imagine that
neither I nor Professors Abraham and Rabin have correctly identified the
future relationship of most Americans to vehicles or the timescale upon
which change will occur. The very prospect that dramatically distinct
modalities of transportation could arise from the ability of vehicles to
drive themselves seems to caution against a preemptive, administratively
intense solution that forbids state legislatures or courts from
experimentation. Not even the apparent inspiration for MER—workers
compensation—represents federal policy; workers comp is rather a
creature of the state that can vary accordingly. Said another way, the
authors’ proposal is certain; the future is not.
II.
The puzzle of how to deal with the contingency of technology and its
social impacts is not limited to driverless cars, but endemic to law and
10
11

Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 130.
Id. at 151–55.
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technology scholarship. Personally I doubt Professors Abraham and
Rabin—each renowned scholars of civil liability—identify themselves as
working in “law and technology” as such. I imagine that for the authors,
the ascendance of automated vehicles is just a fact about the world like
any other, as the progress of technology often is.12 In my experience,
however, reasoning about technological change sometimes requires
special care.
Take the concept of the “driverless car.” The underlying innovations
that make driverless cars possible are, again, the introduction of new
sensors (especially lidar) and improvements in techniques of machine
learning that help computers recognize and react to patterns. These
innovations introduce new human affordances, in the sense of additional
capabilities to interact with our environment.13 But even assuming the end
goal is safely moving people about, there is nothing inevitable about
combining these constituent technologies in a traditional car. That
decision flows from a constellation of choices dating back to the
concerted effort of the automotive industry to promote individual car
ownership, and the attendant—and, some allege, purposive—decimation
of public transportation.14
If we disaggregate the innovation of more accurate sensors and better
machine learning from the construct of a driverless car, then far broader
legal ramifications seem to follow. Consider Professors Abraham and
Rabin’s key argument around why MER is necessary: neither federal
agencies nor courts and juries possess the expertise to unpack the
“esoteric, algorithm-based design differences” between highly automated
vehicles.15 Surely this concern extends well beyond driverless cars to the
12 Thus, for example, the Washington Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the
county for failing to build guardrails in 1928 capable of stopping a horse-drawn cart but not a
car. Davison v. Snohomish Cty., 270 P.2d 422, 423 (Wash. 1928). That same court would later
require a jury to determine whether a railway company was negligent forty years later for
failing to protect against a similar accident on the theory that materials had become stronger
and cheaper. Bartlett v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 447 P.2d 735, 737 (Wash. 1968).
13 For a discussion of affordances, see Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83
U. Chi. L. Rev. 23, 26–30 (2016).
14 See, e.g., Robert C. Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on
Land Use in California 406, 415 (1973); see also Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, Comment,
There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 538 Nature 311, 311–313 (2016) (discussing how the
trolley problem obscures the ways that investment in autonomous driving perpetuates
prioritization of private cars over public transport).
15 Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 142–44. The Toyota sudden acceleration scandal of
2011 provides an excellent example. Congress instructed the DOT to determine whether the
reported propensity of Toyotas suddenly to accelerate was the product of a glitch in the
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very wide array of robotics and cyber-physical systems being marketed
and developed today.16 The reader would be forgiven for wondering what
intellectual foundation there could be to arguing for an elaborate and
expensive MER regime for vehicles but nothing else.
My own view—which I am developing in connection to a larger project
on law and technology—is that any legal scholarship that interacts with
physical and digital artifacts would do well to state and defend a series of
assumptions. Legal scholarship in general tends not to dwell on questions
of methodology. I understand that Professors Abraham and Rabin expect
MER to be evaluated on the basis of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis
because I teach torts and I recognize the language of “optimal,” “adverse
selection,” and “transaction costs.” But law and technology scholarship
in particular would benefit from reflecting on a series of choices that are
today largely implicit.
One set of choices involves the methods and goals of the author. Much
law and technology literature follows Professor Rabin’s former colleague
Lawrence Lessig in understanding new technology as revealing “[l]atent
ambiguities,” or gaps in the law that jurists must now resolve. 17
Scholarship in this mold is at once progressive, in that it takes
technological progress as inevitable, and conservative, in that it
understands the role of law as restoring the status quo ex ante in light of
a disruption. There are alternatives to this approach, ranging from purely
descriptive research that helps provide ground truth, to normative projects
that understand new technology as an invitation to rethink what constitute
realistic societal goals.
The response you are reading concerns another choice: What is the
scope of the technology under examination? Relatedly, what assumptions
are the authors making around the trajectory of the technology or its social
impact?
As a longtime science fiction fan, I remember coming across the early
days of the genre depicting marvelous progress in technology even as
social norms somehow remained constant—1950s science fiction classics

software. The DOT lacked the requisite expertise to answer this question and wound up having
to ask NASA to take a break from placing robots on Mars to look at a Toyota for them. It took
NASA four months, but they eventually cleared Toyota’s software. See Ryan Calo, The Case
for a Federal Robotics Commission, Brookings Inst. (Sept. 15, 2014), [https://perma.cc/4LS2T7HM].
16 These include drones, delivery carts, surgical robots, and personal and service robots.
17 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 22 (1999).
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that invite the viewer to picture a world in which businessmen routinely
commute to Mars on aircraft piloted by white men and serviced by
stewardesses in short skirts. The reality is far more complex.
Technological change occurs against a backdrop of social, cultural, and
economic forces that in turn shape the trajectory of the technology itself.
A wide variety of factors suggest that we may be on the cusp of a sea
change in transportation. The very distinctions between manufacturer,
owner, and consumers seem likely to collapse. The trouble with
technology—and hence law and technology scholarship—is that truly
novel affordances tend to invite reexamination of how we live. Legal
scholarship must acknowledge this prospect or risk being its casualty.

